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CHAPTER III 
CLAIMS CONCERNING LAWFUL AREAS OF 
OPERATION: SUBMARINE OPERATIONAL AREAS 
In times of relatively low coercion the high seas are an international 
resource open to the peaceful uses of all states. The community policies 
reflected in the legal doctrines of the law of the sea in time of peace are 
designed to encourage the most comprehensive shared used and exploitation 
of the high seas.1 One of the principal uses of the sea has been described 
by Admiral Mahan: 
The first and most ol?vious light in which the sea presents itself 
from the political and social point of view is that of a great highway; 
or better, perhaps, of a wide common, over which men may pass in 
all directions, but on which some well-worn paths show that control-
ling reasons have led them to choose certain lines of travel rather 
others.2 
In times of relatively high coercion and violence the legal doctrines 
permit belligerents to conduct hostilities upon the high seas which are the 
same areas permitted to neutral states for trade and other uses. It is ap-
parent that these conflicting uses in times usually called war will bring 
about claims by belligerents against neutrals and by neutrals against bellig-
erents. It is a principal purpose of the international law concerning high 
seas operational areas to resolve these claims. Another principal purpose 
of this branch of law is to resolve interbelligerent claims concerning the 
use of high seas operational areas as a distinct method of conducting 
hostilities. 
It is well established doctrine that lawful naval combatant forces are 
legally permitted to operate on the high seas as well as in the territorial 
1 The textual statement is implicit in the literature: 4 Whiteman 499- 739; Colom-
bos 1-431; 1 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, International Law: Peace 582-635 (8th ed. 
1955); 2 Hackworth 651 - 759. The statement is documented in McDougal & Burke, 
The Public Order of the Oceans: A Contemporary International Law of the Sea 
(1962). 
For a future projection see Burke, Ocean Sciences~ Technology~ and the Future 
International Law of the Sea ( 1966). 




waters and the internal waters of belligerents.3 Such operations are forbid-
den in neutral territorial waters.4 This prohibition is conditioned upon the 
mutual observance of such neutral immunity by both naval belligerents.5 
The principal claims and controversies concerning areas of operation in 
modern naval warfare, both between belligerents and neutrals and inter-
belligerent, have been connected with the lawfulness of operational areas 
enforced, inter alia, by submarines, aircraft, and mines. 
As employed by both sides during the World Wars, operational areas 
were directed at the enemy belligerent and also at neutrals who traded 
with the enemy. As to the enemy, the claim was to the employment of a 
particularly severe method of naval warfare, frequently involving sinking 
of all enemy vessels upon sight, within the specified area. As to neutrals, 
the claim was to prevent neutral commerce with the enemy by excluding 
neutral ships from the use of the operational area except use which is con-
trolled by the claimant-belligerent. Operational areas enforced by sub-
marines have been one of several methods of conducting economic warfare 
against the enemy through control of the neutrals. 6 
A. THE ECONOMIC WARFARE CONTEXT OF CLAIMS TO 
ESTABLISH OPERATIONAL AREAS IN GENERAL WAR 
SITUATIONS 
Economic warfare is, of course, designed to have an adverse impact 
upon the enemy belligerent. Neutral states constitute the vital external 
source of supply for the enemy belligerent. Consequently, economic war-
fare measures directed against neutral states have an impact upon the 
enemy belligerent. 7 
The belligerent claim to control or prohibit economic intercourse with 
the enemy involves the carrying out of three separate functions. The first 
is the characterization of the goods to be prohibited or controlled and it 
includes examining the relation of the goods to the military power of the 
3 Stone 5 71 ; Law of Naval Warfare section 430. 
4 Ibid. Article V of Hague Convention XIII provides: "Belligerents are forbidden 
to use neutral ports and waters as a base of naval operations .... " 
5 The principal example of World War II is the Altmark case: Colombos 600-01; 
McDougal & Feliciano 454-56; Oppenheim-Lauterpacht 693-95; 7 Hackworth 
568-75. See Waldock, "The Release of the Altmark's Prisoners," 24 Brit. Y.B.l.L. 
216 (1947). The principal example of World War I is the Dresden case: Colombos 
600; Oppenheim-Lauterpacht 755; 7 Hackworth 370-72. 
See the astonishing suggestion by the Chairman of the United States Delegation 
to the Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea ( 1958) that belligerent submarines 
could operate in neutral territorial waters "practically inviolable" from surface war-
ships in Dean, "The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: What Was Accom-
plished," 52 A.].l'.L. 607, 610-11 ( 1958). 
6 The various methods of economic warfare are described in 1 and 2 Medlicott. 
7 See e.g. 1 Medlicott 468-508. 
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enemy. 8 The traditional doctrines distinguishing between "free goods," 
"conditional contraband," and "absolute contraband" were designed to 
facilitate this characterization.9 "Free goods" were those deemed to be 
incapable of military use. "Conditional contraband" covered goods which 
could be used for military or civilian purposes and it was usually necessary 
also to show their military destination before they could be controlled or 
prohibited. "Absolute contraband" was limited to goods which were spe-
cialized for military uses. In a war situation in which major powers remain 
neutral, it may be expected that belligerent characterization of goods will 
take account of neutral interests in maintaining trade with the enemy 
belligerent. In situations of general war, such as the two World Wars, the 
contraband lists became more comprehensive as neutral interests and in-
fluence declined. 1~0 It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that belligerent 
decisions in this field are determined in substantial part by neutral power 
and purpose.11 
The second function is the actual stopping of the flow of neutral goods 
imported by the enemy.12 In addition, based upon the practice of the two 
World Wars, it now involves stopping the flow of enemy exports to neutrals 
as well.13 The principal objective in stopping enemy exports has been to 
prevent the enemy from earning foreign exchange credits. The range of 
methods employed by belligerents to stop economic intercourse with the 
enemy has been very great. Traditionally it involved visit and search 14 
and capture of suspected individual vessels and the use of "close-in" naval 
blockades.15 In the World Wars it included the occasional use of the 
methods just mentioned and also extended to "long-distance" naval block-
ades and high seas operational areas or "war zones" as well as to compre-
hensive administrative techniques of economic warfare 16 which changed 
the locus of enforcement from the high seas to the docks. 
The third function is the disposition of the goods and of the vessel or 
8 Colombos 633-57; McDougal & Feliciano 481-88; Oppenheim-Lauterpacht 
799-813; 7 Hackworth 14-99. 
9 The distinctions are articulated in Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libris Tres, Bk. 
III, Ch. I, section 5, 2 Classics of International Law 602 (Kelsey transl. 1925). 
10 Seymour, American Diplomacy During the World War 32-34 ( 1934). 
11 See Buehrig 85- 105 ( Ch. 5 entitled "The Defense of Trade") ( 1955). See 
generally Percy, Maritime Trade in War ( 1930): 
12 Colombos 672- 752; McDougal & Feliciano 488-509; Oppenheim-Lauterpacht 
768- 90, 848-68. 
13 McDougal & Feliciano 501 - 07; 1 Medlicott 112-24. 
11 The procedures of visit and search are described in Harvard Research Naval 
' War 535-47. The black letter summary of visit and search in the Harvard Research 
is quoted in the ~xt of Ch. IV, section A. 
15 Traditional blockades are described in Tucker 283-95. 
111 Such techniques are described in 1 Medlicott 415- 29. See also Y. Wu, Economic 
Warfare passim ( 1 95 2). 
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aircraft carrying them.17 The extreme alternative courses of action are 
release of the goods and craft on the one hand and destruction without 
warning on the other. It is obviously in the interests of a belligerent capa-
ble of rational calculations of self-interest to condemn the goods and the 
carrier and requisition them for his own purposes wherever possible.18 
The present chapter focuses upon the second of the above described 
functions of economic warfare, stopping the flow of commerce between 
neutrals and the enemy belligerent, and particularly upon submarine op-
erational areas as a method of accomplishing this. It should be recognized 
that all of the economic control methods, ranging from occasional visit 
and search to submarine operational areas and comprehensive administra-
tive techniques applied at the source, are but different methods of achiev-
ing the central objective of stopping neutral commerce with the enemy 
belligerent which may benefit the latter.19 In selecting particular methods 
of economic control, a belligerent must take into account its economic and 
military resources including the kind of naval power which it has. A 
belligerent with predominantly surface naval power usually selects a 
method of stopping commerce with the opposing belligerent which can be 
made effective by surface naval power. In the same way, a belligerent 
which does not command the surface of the sea but which has effective 
submarine naval power, Germany being the obvious example, is compelled 
to select a method of commerce interdiction which can be enforced by 
submarine naval forces. 20 
In selecting particular economic control methods there are certain tra-
ditional modes of stopping commerce with the enemy which must be 
avoided by surface and submarine naval powers alike because of the 
technical conditions of modern warfare. Specifically, the traditional pro-
cedures of visiting and searching a suspected merchant vessel on the high 
seas are inconsistent with the elementary requirements of self-preservation 
for both surface and submarine warships. 21 The surface warship which 
attempts to follow these procedures becomes particularly vulnerable to 
submarine and air attack. The submarine, during the World Wars, was 
even more vulnerable to these types of attack. In addition, the submarine 
which attempted to lower a boat for visit and search was vulnerable to 
attack by ramming and gunfire from merchant ships. 
17 Colombos 758-83; Oppenheim-Lauterpacht 869-79; Rowson, "Prize Law Duri~g 
the Second World War," 24 Brit. Y.B.I.L. 160 ( 1947); Fitzmaurice, "Some Aspects 
of Modern Contraband Control and the Law of Prize," 22 Brit. Y.B.I.L. 73 ( 1945). 
18 Phillips, "Capture at Sea in Perspective," 91 Nav. lnst. Proc. No. 4, p. 60 ( 1965) 
sets forth the interest in capture as opposed to sinking. 
19 See McDouga~ & Feliciano 4 79. 
20 The German reasons for resorting to the use of submarines against commerce are 
set forth in Scheer, Germany's High Sea Fleet in the World War 215-58 (1920). 
21 See 7 Hackworth 6. 
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It is impossible to conduct anything but the most superficial search 
of a large merchant vessel at sea whether the warship attempting to make 
the search is a surface or submarine one. The surface naval powers, in 
consequence, adopted the technique of diversion during the World Wars. 22 
Under this technique a suspected merchant vessel was diverted to a des-
ignated control port where a comprehensive examination of the cargo 
could be made. This technique was not available to a submarine naval 
power since its exercise was dependent upon control of the surface of 
the sea. 
The time-honored "close-in" naval blockade involved the use of sta-
tionary or slowly cruising warships immediately off the coast of the 
blockaded state. 23 This type of blockade was not employed by any naval 
belligerent against any major enemy naval power during the World 
Wars. 24 It is obvious that the blockading vessels would have been sub-
jected to the same type of dangers involved in attempting to visit and 
search. 25 In response to the dangers of employment of submarines, mines, 
and aircraft, and to the requirements of effective economic warfare, the 
surface naval powers employed the so-called "long-distance" blockade 
against Germany. 26 The actual naval enforcement of the blockade against 
Germany consisted of patrolling strategic high seas passages on the routes 
to Germany at some distance from Germany itsel£.27 In performing this 
task the surface naval powers were in a position to rely primarily upon 
surface rather than upon submarine warships. The surface warships were 
usually supplemented by other means including mines and aircraft. 
The long-distance blockade enforced in the manner described was 
22 See id. at 182-201. 
The legality of diversion is maintained in Garner, "Violations of Maritime Law by 
the Allied Powers during the World War," 25 A.].I.L. 26 (1931). It is denied in 
Warren, "Lawless Maritime Warfare," 18 Foreign Affairs 424 ( 1940). 
23 The requirements for lawfulness of such blockades were: ( 1) the juridical com-
petence to establish the blockade possessed by the belligerent government; ( 2) the 
formal declaration of establishment and its communication to neutrals; ( 3) "effec-
tiveness" in the sense of reasonably efficient enforcement as opposed to a "paper" 
blockade. Tucker 287-89; 7 Hackworth 114-34. 
24 In World War I close-in blockades were employed against German East Africa, 
the Cameroons, portions of Asia Minor, Kiauchau in China, and some other coasts 
without modern defenses. 2 Garner 318-19. In the Russo-Finnish War of 1939 the 
Soviet Union employed a close-in blockade. McDougal & Feliciano 491. The mod-
ern impracticability of such blockades is stressed in Colombos 693. 
25 Blockade in the strict legal use of the term-that is, the close investment of 
the enemy's coasts or ports-was regarded as scarcely practicable under modern 
conditions of warfare .... 
Medlicott 23. 
26 A classic study of the World War I blockade is Guichard The Naval Blockade 
' 1914-1918 (Turner transl. 1930). See also Parmelee, Blockade and Sea Power 
( 1924) ; Malkin, "Blockade in Modern Conditions," 3 Brit. Y.B.I.L. 87 ( 1923). 
27 E.g. the passage between the Shetland Islands and Iceland. Roskill 37. 
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a method of commerce interdiction which was not available to Germany 
because of its lack of surface naval power. In response to the same realities 
of modern naval warfare which brought about the employment of the 
long-distance blockade, Germany developed the operational area enforced 
by submarines as its p reeminent method of interdicting commerce with 
the United K ingdom. 2 8 For a time during the First World War, Germany 
attempted to apply differential treatment to enemy and neutral merchant 
ships in the p rescribed area. Only the enemy merchant ships were sunk 
without warning and, in theory at least, the neutrals were spared this fate. 29 
Because of the tactical difficulty, and indeed impossibility in many situa-
tions, of a submarine attempting to distinguish between neutral and enemy 
merchant vessels, the attempt was doomed to failure. Germany was pre-
sented with the dilemma whereby it either had to abandon submarine 
enforcement of its areas for all ships or apply that enforcement to all ships 
including neutrals. The German dilemma is reflected in the considerable 
diplomatic correspondence between Germany and the United States while 
the latter was a neutral. 30 
The long-distance blockade was employed in both World Wars as a 
part of the comprehensive system of Allied economic warfare. The follow-
ing conception of such economic warfare, with specific reference to the 
Second World War, is provided by Professor Medlicott: 
Economic warfare is a military operation, comparable to the opera-
tions of the three Services in that its object is the defeat of the enemy, 
and complementary to them in that its function is to deprive the enemy 
of the material means of resistance. But, unlike the operations of the 
Armed Forces, its results are secured not only by direct attack upon 
the enemy but also by bringing p ressure to bear upon those neutral 
countries from which the enemy draws his supplies. It must be dis-
tinguished from coercive m easures appropriate for adoption in peace 
to settle international differences without recourse to war, e.g., sanc-
tions, pacific blockade, economic reprisals, etc., since, unlike such 
measures, it h as as its ultimate sanction the use of belligerent rights. 31 
It should not be supposed that either the long-distance blockade or 
comprehensive economic warfare was only a British concern. A study with 
28 Factual description appears in Gibson & Prendergast, The German Submarine 
War 1914-191 8 ( 19 3 1 ) . 
29 See the text accompanying notes 46-48 infra. 
30 The diplomatic correspondence appears in: [1917] Foreign Rel. U.S. Supp. No. 
1 ( 1931); [191 6] Foreign Rel U.S. Supp. (1929); [1915] Foreign Rel. U.S. Supp. 
( 1928). Critical analysis appears in Buehrig passim. 
31 1 Medlicott 1 7. The term "economic warfare" was planned as comprehensive 
and covering the en tire field . Id. at 12-17. Narrower terms such as "blockade" were 
rejected as "out of date and inadequate" in reflecting the activities involved. I d. at 
16. The "economic blockade" subject of Professor Medlicott's two volumes is but a 
part of "economic warfare." I d . at 17. -
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specific reference to the First World War has described the role of the 
United States: 
[O]f all the nations engaged in the World War none was more ready to 
make full use of its own economic power than the United States. 
When the United States entered the war one of the first demands 
which she made on Britain and the other allies was that they should 
enforce a still more complete embargo on exports from their terri-
tories to doubtful destinations in Europe than they had previously 
thought it necessary to impose, and she herself for many months stop-
ped all exports whatsoever, both to the Scandinavian countries and 
to Holland. She had made bitter complaints against the blacklisting 
by the British government of German -firms in South and Central 
America, but as soon as she entered the war she carried the blacklist 
policy even farther on her own initiative. She has never admitted 
complicity with the action of the British navy against neutral trade, 
even after the American navy was patrolling the seas side by side 
with the British navy, but in the use of the economic resources of the 
allied and associated Powers as bargaining counters and as means of 
bringing pressure to bear on neutral countries, she not only eagerly 
accepted the position of an accomplice, but even took the lead in 
giving this kind of economic weapon a keener edge and in wielding 
it more effec_:tively. 32 
Consistent with the comprehensive conception of economic warfare, it 
is significant that the belligerent objective of completely interdicting com-
mercial intercourse between the enemy belligerent and neutrals is now 
widely accepted as lawful in general war. 33 This reflects the actual economic 
warfare techniques of the World Wars and cha~ges the focus of legal anal-
ysis from the objective itself to the various methods of achieving it. In 
particular, the legality of the operational area enforced by submarines h as 
been questioned. The appraisal of such areas under law is made in the 
balance of this chapter. 
B. CLAIMS TO ESTABUSH SUBMARINE OPERATIONAL 
AREAS IN GENERAL WAR SITUATIONS 
The German claims are considered at the outset since they were first 
in time and are of central importance for legal appraisal. 
32 Percy, Maritime Trade in War 58, 59 ( 1930) . 
In 1946 the U nited Sta tes Governmen t aband oned a plan to write the history of 
the American role in economic warfa re. 2 M edlicott x. The Medlicott study,, however, 
is a lso va luable in d escribing the American ro le. See e.g. id. at 19- 25; 26-62. 
33 Colombos 509- 10; M cDougal & Feliciano 4 78- 79; Stone 508- 10; Oppenheim-
Lauterpach t 796- 97. Professor Lauterpach t refers to the diminished "cogency of the 
cla im of neutrals to unimped ed commercia l in tercourse with the belligerents." Oppcn-
heim-La u terpach t 796, n. 1. 
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I . German Claims 
a. THE FIRST WORLD WAR 
O n February 4, 1915 Germany proclaimed an "area of war" in the 
waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland. 34 The Chancellor's Pro-
clamation transmitted by the German Ambassador in Washington to the 
U.S. Secretary of State invoked retaliation against Great Britain. 35 In 
relevant part it provided : 
Just as England has designated the area between Scotland and 
Norway as an area of war, so Germany now declares all the waters 
surrounding Great Britain and I reland including the entire English 
Channel as an area of war, and thus will proceed against the shipping 
of the enemy. 
For this purpose beginning February 18, 1915 it will endeavor to de-
stroy every enemy merchant ship that is found in this area of war with-
out its always being possible to avert the peril, that thus threatens 
persons and cargoes. Neutrals are therefore warned against further 
entrusting crews, passengers and wares to such ships. Their attention 
[is] also called to the fact, that it is advisable for their ships to avoid 
entering this area, for even though the German naval forces have in-
structions to avoid violence to neutral ships in so far as they are re-
cognizable, in view of the misuse of neutral flags ordered by the 
British Government and the contingencies of naval warfare their be-
coming victims of torpedoes directed against enemy ships cannot al-
ways be avoided; at the same time it is specifically noted that shipping 
north of Shetland Islands in the eastern area of the North Sea and in 
a strip of at least thirty sea m iles in width along the Netherlands 
coast is not imperiled.36 
It should be noted that submarine enforcement was not mentioned. 
Since the German Navy lacked the power to provide enforcement by sur-
face warships (except on an occasional basis), submarine enforcement 
34 [1915] Foreign Rel. U.S. S upp. 95 ( 1928). 
35 The reta liation was in response to the British "area of war" of Nov. 3, 1914 
which was, in turn, in retaliation for alleged illegal German minelaying. The British 
area appears in [1914] Foreign Rel. U.S. Supp. 463 (1928). Its central paragraph 
provides: 
They therefore give notice that the whole of the North Sea must be considered 
a military area. Within this area merchant shipping of all kinds, traders of all 
countries, fish ing craft, and all other vessels will be exposed to the gravest 
dangers from mines which it has been necessary to lay and from warships 
searching vigilantly by night and day for suspicious craft. 
I d. a t 464. Safe routes were prescribed for neutral vessels. Ibid. 
In the note of Nov. 10, 1914 from the Secretary of State to the U.S. minister in 
Norway the United States refused to join other neutrals in protesting the British zone. 
[1 9 14] Foreign Rel. U.S. Supp. 466 (1928). 
36 [191 5] Foreign Rel. U.S. Supp. 95, 96 ( 1928). 
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was implicit. Further, the Proclamation was directed at "enemy" but not 
at neutral merchant shipping and safe areas were designated for the 
latter. 37 Because of the difficulties encountered by submarines in attempt-
ing to distinguish neutrals from belligerents, neutral merchant ships were 
sunk- in the "area of war." Neutrals, particularly the United States, claimed 
the illegality of the submarine operational area. This resulted in German 
Government vacillation in the actual application of submarine enforce-
ment in the area. 38 
The British merchant vessel Lusitania (unarmed but carrying munitions 
from the United States to the United Kingdom) was torpedoed in the 
operational area on May 7, 1915 with considerable loss of American as 
well as British lives. 39 There followed a year of claim and counterclaim 
between the United States and Germany in 'which the United States main-
tained the position that nothing in the accepted principles of international 
law or in any proper extension of them justified the sinking of belligerent 
merchantmen transporting neutral passengers in the German operational 
area.40 The German Government's note of May 4, 1916 to the United 
States stated: 
In accordance with the general principles of visit and search and 
destruction of merchant vessels recognized by international law, such 
vessels, both within and without the area declared as naval war zone, 
shall not be sunk without warning and without saving human lives, 
unless these ships attempt to escape or offer resistance.41 
* * * * * * * 
The German submarine forces have had, in fact, orders to conduct 
submarine warfare in accordance with the general principles of visit 
and search and destruction of merchant vessels as recognized by 
international law, the sole exception being the conduct of warfare 
against the enemy trade carried on enemy freight ships that are 
encountered in the war zone surrounding Great Britain .... 42 
This was nothing less than German agreement with the major conten-
tions of the United States. Specifically, Germany conceded that even in 
the "war zone" unarmed belligerent merchantmen with the sole exception 
of cargo ships (as opposed to passenger ships) were to be accorded treat-
ment by submarines in accordance with the traditional rules of interna-
tional law regulating attack by surface warships. This amounted to a 
37 Compare with the text Colombos 488. 
3
"Potter & Nimitz 456-58 (1960). 
3r~ [1915] Foreign Rel. U.S. Supp. 384 ( 1928). 
40 The United States made demand to Germany for disavowal, reparation, and 
assurances in its note of May 13, 1915. Id. at 393-96. 
41 [1916] Foreign Rel. U.S. Supp. 257,259 (1929). 
42 I d. at 2 5 7. 
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withdrawal of the German operational area claim of February 4, 1915 
as to belligerent unarmed passenger vessels. 
The termination of the German submarine operational area does not 
necessarily lead to the conclusion that the German position was untenable 
in law. Its significance was that Germany was not prepared to maintain 
its legal position at the risk of war with the determined and powerful 
neutral United States.43 Even though Germany admitted its willingness 
"to use the submarine weapon in strict conformity with the rules of inter-
national law as recognized before the outbreak of the war," the note speci-
fically referred to the objective of the United States obtaining British 
adherence to the traditional rules. The note concluded by stating that if 
the United States were not successful in this objective, Germany "would 
then be facing a new situation in which it must preserve [for] itself com-
plete liberty of decision." 44 It is well known that the United States had 
no more success in modifying the British long-distance naval blockade 
after May 4, 1916 than it had achieved before then. The real issue con-
fronted by the German decision-makers did not include the possibility of 
modification of the increasingly successful British methods of economic 
warfare. The central issue was whether Germany would abandon the use 
of submarine operational area warfare or risk war with the United States.45 
It might have been militarily advantageous to Germany to make the deci-
sion in 1916 but it was nevertheless delayed until 1917. 
The German "unrestricted" submarine warfare claim within a prescribed 
operational "zone" was set forth in enclosures to a message of January 31, 
1917 from the German Ambassador in Washington to the U.S. Secretary 
of State: 
Germany has, so far, not made unrestricted use of the weapon which 
she possesses in her submarines. Since the Entente powers, however, 
have made it impossible to come to an understanding based upon 
equality of rights of all nations, as proposed by the Central powers, 
and have instead declared only such a peace to be possible which shall 
be dictated by the Entente allies and shall result in the destruction 
43 In Prof. Buehrig's view the United States demands on Germany following the 
Lusitania sinking "left n.o recourse except war, should Germany fail to keep the 
submarine within bounds acceptable to the United States." Buehrig 126. 
44 [1916] Foreign Rel. U.S. Supp. 257, 260 (1929). 
In acknowledging that the German operational area policy announced on Feb. 4, 
1915 was "now happily abandoned" the United States rejected the suggestion in the 
German note that the changed German policy was contingent upon the successful 
outcome of negotiations between the United States and the United Kingdom designed 
to maintain the traditional United States rights as a neutral against the British. The 
United States note of May 8, 1916 added: "Responsibility in such matters is single, 
not joint; absolute, not relative." I d. at 263. 
45 On the military and political factors in the decision see Buehrig 71-75; Millis, 
The Road to War: America 1914-1917 354-82 ( 1935 ). 
and humiliation of the Central powers, Germany is unable further 
to forego the full use of her submarines .... 
Under these circumstances Germany will meet the illegal measures of 
her enemies by forcibly preventing after February 1, 1917, in a zone 
around Great Britain, France, Italy, and in the eastern Mediterranean 
all navigation, that of neutrals included, from and to England and 
from and to France, etc., etc. [sic] All ships met within that zone will 
be sunk.46 
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This claim was expressly directed against neutrals as well as belligerents. 
It specifically invoked submarine enforcement. American passenger ships 
were permitted to sail once a week in each direction between the United 
States and the United Kingdom proyided that the United States Govern-
ment guaranteed that no contraband according to the German list was 
carried. 47 Its juridical basis was not a claim of legal right but was rather 
stated to be a legitimate reprisal measure based upon alleged British 
violations of international law. It is well known that the present German 
claim provided the ostensible basis for the participation of the United 
States as a belligerent.48 
( 1) Appraisal as Reprisal 
Initial appraisal should be made in terms of reprisal since it was 
invoked. In addition, some writers regard reprisal as central to the legal 
analysis of this subject. For example, Professor Tucker states: 
[I]t does not appear possible to assert that-apart from reprisal-bel-
ligerents have at present the right to restrict the movement of neutral 
vessels within vast tracts of the open seas merely by proclaiming that 
these areas have been rendered dangerous-in one form or an-
other-to neutral shipping. Hence, despite bellgerent [sic] practices 
in two wars the establishment of war zones forms a lawful measure 
only when taken in response to the persistent misconduct of an 
enemy.49 
In typical formulation reprisals are acts of retaliation undertaken 
through a course of conduct, otherwise unlawful, employed by one belli-
gerent against the enemy belligerent for acts committed by the latter 
contrary to the law of war.50 The object of -reprisals is deemed to be 
inducing the enemy to abandon its illegal methods of warfare. Appraisal 
46 [1917] Foreign Rel. U.S. Supp. No.1 97, 100 (1931). 
nld. at 102. 
4~ Beuhrig passim sets forth various bases including United States concern over a 
possible German victory. 
4
!} Tucker 305 (footnotes omitted). 
50 Stone 353- 56; Oppenheim-Lauterpacht 561 - 63. See the text of Ch. I accom-
panying note 89. 
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of reprisals in the present context must, therefore, consider the maJor 
features of British naval warfare. 
The United Kingdom armed its merchant ships and issued instructions 
that they were to open fire upon German submarines.51 These actions 
could be regarded as violations of the traditional law which only permits 
duly commissioned naval vessels to initiate attack.52 It seems quite im-
possible to maintain that such British merchant ship departures from or 
violations of the traditional law are valid while holding that German sub-
marine departures from or violations of the same law are invalid. Con-
sequently, sinking without further warning than that involved in notifica-
tion of the operational area to British merchant ships may be justified as a 
legitimate reprisal. It should be noted that the specific modality of the 
reprisal, the submarine operational area, was directed particularly to these 
British merchant ship violations of the traditionallaw.53 
It may be recalled that from a German perspective the British long-
distance blockade was a "hunger blockade" since foodstuffs were not 
allowed through it to Germany.54 In the British view, the traditional law 
required visit and search of merchant ships by submarines in order to 
protect "noncombatant" values. If this is accepted, it is difficult to avoid 
the conclusion that the same law also required maintenance of the distinc-
tion between absolute and conditional contraband concerning the British 
blockade, thus permitting food shipments to German "noncombatants." 55 
It is concluded, therefore, that the actual British blockade methods also 
•
51 The most explicit evidence appears in the enclosures to the note of Feb. 14, 1916 
from the U.S. Ambassador in Berlin to the Secretary of State. The enclosures included 
British Government instructions to masters and gun crews of "defensively" armed 
merchant ships which were captured by Germany on the English steamer Woodfield. 
The instructions appear in [1916] Foreign Rel. U.S. Supp. 187, 191-98 (1929). See 
particularly id. at 196. The instructions are quoted in relevant part in the text of 
Ch IV, section B. 
52 The ambivalence of the doctrinal formulations is adequately illustrated by 
Oppenheim-Lauterpacht 467-68: "Any merchantman of a belligerent attacking a 
public or private vessel of the enemy would be considered a pirate and treated as 
such ... " but, "it was perfectly legitimate for merchantmen of the Allies to attempt 
to ram German submarines even if signaled to stop and submit to visitation." 
53 If reprisals are designed to induce the opposing belligerent to give up its unlaw.: 
ful measures, it is desirable to direct the reprisals against the specific unlawful 
measures. See generally Oppenheim-Lau terpacht 563. 
54 Admiral Scheer provides illustration: 
When the starvation of Germany was recognised as the goal the British Govern-
ment were striving to reach, we had to realise what means we had at our dis-
posal to defend ourselves against this danger. England was in a position to exert 
enormous pressure. We could not count on any help from the neutrals. 
Germany's High Sea Fleet in the World War 219 (1920). 
55 It was indeed upon the civilian population that the [blockade] action of the 
Allies bore with the greatest weight; since Germany was able, thanks to her 
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provided adequate justification for the submarine operational area as a 
legitimate reprisal. 
In addition, it should be remembered that the British employed "Q-
ships" as a ruse of naval warfare designed to entrap and destroy sub-
marines.56 These ships appeared to be innocent merchantmen but actually 
were warships with substantial armament. The extent of the "warning" 
they afforded to a submarine attempting to comply with the traditional 
law is that the British naval ensign was hoisted simultaneously with open-
ing fire. 57 The signifiance of the Q-ships is that they made it impossible 
for submarines to attempt compliance with visit and search of merchant 
ships without regard to whether a particular merchant ship appeared to 
be armed or to have wireless equipment. If the Q-ships were a lawful ruse 
of war, it also can be maintained p~rsuasively that the German use of a 
submarine operational area was a lawful measure. If, on the other hand, 
the employment of Q-ships was illegal, the submarine operational area 
may be deemed a legitimate reprisal to it. 
It should be mentioned that the British established the first modern 
operational area, designating the entire North Sea as "a military area," 
on November 3, 1914.58 The German operational area may be justified 
as a legitimate reprisal to the British one. If the submarine operational 
area as a legitimate reprisal measure could be properly invoked against 
each of the particular British methods of naval war alone, it seems abun-
dantly clear that it was justified by the combination of them. 
Consideration should also be given to the validity of the German opera-
tional area as a reprisal affecting neutrals. The position of the United 
States, while a neutral, was that interbelligerent reprisals could not affect 
the rights of neutrals.59 It is difficult to see how the United States could 
energy and ingenuity, to keep her armies supplied with food and material up to 
the armistice. 
Guichard, The Naval Blockade 1914- 1918 304 (Turner transl. 1930). 
56 Scheer, op. cit . supra note 54 at 262; Campbell, My Mystery Ships ( 1928); 
R. W. Smith, "The Q-Ship-Cause and Effect," 79 Nav. Inst. Proc. 533 ( 1953). 
57 
"[Q-ships] were fitted with a very carefully concealed armament, which was kept 
hidden until the submarine was within point-b lank range .... " Jellicoe, The Grand 
Fleet 1914-1 91 6 2 6 2 ( 1 91 9 ) . 
58 Supra note 35. Oppenheim-Lauterpacht 681-82, in attempting to distinguish 
between the British and German a~eas, state: 
In both cases neutral shipping suffered grievous hardship, but the British Govern-
ment did at least indicate lanes through the mine-fields through which ships 
might pass with safety .... 
59 The United States note to Germany of July 21, 1915, for example, states: 
If a belligerent cannot retaliate against an enemy without injuring [sic] the lives 
of neutrals, as well as their property, humanity, as well as justice and a due 
regard for the dignity of neutral powers, should dictate that the practice be 
discontinued. 
[1915] Foreign Rel. U.S. Supp. 480, 481 (1928). The German note to the United 
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establish and expand a wartime trade with the United Kingdom which 
supplied the latter with the sinews of war and expect at the same time to 
be immune from German belligerent reprisals. 6° From the beginning of 
the war the United States had protested but acquiesced in the British 
long-distance blockade measures which effectively stopped its trade with 
Germany.61 In addition, the belligerent United States by laying the great 
mine barrage between the Orkney Islands and the Norwegian coast during 
the First World War, with its impact upon neutrals, may have changed 
its earlier position.62 It is concluded, consequently, that the actual impact 
States of Feb. 16, 1916 indicates apparent agreement. In referring to the Lusitania 
sinking, it states, "[T]he German retaliation affected neutrals which was not the 
intention, as retaliation should be confined to enemy subjects." [ 1916] Foreign Rel. 
U.S.Supp.171 (1929). 
60 See notes 86, 8 7, infra. 
61 The United States note to Great Britain of Dec. 26, 1914, for example, protested 
against seizures and detentions of American cargoes destined to neutral European 
ports. [1914] Foreign Rel. U.S. Supp. 372 ( 1928). 
62 Because of its impact upon neutrals, the United States, with minimum consis-
tency, could not and did not justify the barrage as a reprisal measure. The United 
States note to Norway of Aug. 27, 1918 described the mine barrage as follows: 
The Government of the United States is also advised that the Norwegian 
Government has been informed that the Governments of the United States and 
Great Britain are engaged in laying a barrage across that portion of the North 
Sea lying between Scotland and Norway, which when completed will effectively 
prevent the passage of enemy submarines to and from the Atlantic Ocean by 
the northern route through the North Sea provided that they are not permitted 
illegal passage through the territorial waters of Norway. 
[1918] Foreign Rel. U.S. Supp. No.1 vol. 2, 1782, 1783 ( 1933). 
Prof. Hyde has written: 
Excuse for the belligerent achievement was seen in the fact that it proved to be 
a vital and necessary means of safeguarding the shipping of the Allied and 
Associated Powers from the dire consequences of illegal conduct of the enemy 
persistently exemplied in the methods employed in submarine attacks. The lay-
ing of the barrage constituted a direct mode of combating a particular activity 
of the enemy, and called for no invocation of the theory of retaliation as a prop 
to support it in the face of neutral opposition. 
Hyde 1945. This analysis supports the wisdom of the United States in not invoking 
:r;etaliation although Prof. Hyde concedes that the mine barrage arose from the 
"illegal conduct of the enemy." Apparently, if a belligerent does not invoke retalia• 
tion, legal justification may be made without it. 
Kenworthy & Young, Freedom of the Seas 97 (undated, circa 1928) after stating 
that the U.S. Navy laid 57,000 moored mines while the British laid 13,000, continue: 
And by rigidly restricting neutral merchant shipping to certain well-defined and 
narrow channels they made the control of the sea-routes to Germany absolute. 
From that time forward, no neutral merchant ship, even if she escaped bunker 
control, black lists, export restrictions and search in harbours could, without an 
Allied permit, hope to reach a port in a rationed neutral country. Which final 
denial of all neutral rights at sea was another contribution of America. 
Factual description appears in the U ~S. Office of Naval Records and Library, The 
Northern Mine Barrage and Other Mining Activities ( 1920). 
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of the German measures upon the United States and other neutrals cannot 
deprive these measures of their status as legitimate reprisals. 
(2) Appraisal as Claim of Right 
Although upheld as a legitimate reprisal, it is necessary to appraise 
the lawfulness of the submarine operations area apart from reprisal. Some 
commentators have concluded that such areas are unlawful. For example, 
Professor Garner has stated flatly: 
As for the German war zone decree of January 1917, it was so fla-
grantly contrary to the laws of maritime warfare that nothing can 
be said in defense of it. 63 
Professor Tucker has stated similar views: 
Even if completely effective in preventing all neutral traffic with an 
enemy, and this possibility can no longer be excluded, the methods 
that have characterized war zone, operations would not warrant 
serious consideration in this respect, for the degree of effective danger 
that is to attend the attempt to break blockade must be a lawful 
danger. There is no basis for the belief that the requirement of effec-
tiveness, demanded of lawful blockades, can be met simply by using 
any means in order to render dangerous the passage of neutral vessels 
through areas of the high seas declared to be blockaded.64 
In making such an appraisal, it is sometimes pointed out that new 
weapons and methods of warfare (apparently meaning the submarine and 
its use) do not bring about new rules of international law.65 It is clear 
63 1 Garner 354. 
64 Tucker 298 (footnotes omitted). 
Prof. Stone concludes that war zones on the high seas are lawful as between 
belligerents. Stone 5 72. He does not reach a conclusion as to their lawfulness against 
neutrals. I d. at 5 74. 
Prof. Lauterpacht concludes that war zones are lawful as between belligerents 
providing that the submarines used "comply with the laws of maritime warfare." 
Oppenheim-Lauterpacht 682. In his view, the use of war zones as to neutrals "can 
only be justified as a repri~al." I d. at 683-84. 
Prof. Hyde states: 
If, however, the belligerent can prove that its interference [through operational 
areas] with the neutral is inconsequential in comparison with the advantage to 
itself necessarily connected with the defense of its territory, the safety of which 
is otherwise jeopardized, the excuse is entitled to respectful consideration. 
3 Hyde 1949. 
Prof. Keith reached a tentative wartime conclusion in 1944: 
What is clear is that the change in the nature of naval weapons and methods of 
warfare may compel revision of the issue of freedom of neutral navigation by 
sea; as custom has recognized the right of blockade and of visit, search and 
capture for carriage of contraband or the performance of unneutral service, so 
it may authorize use of the conception of war zones. 
2 Keith ( ed.) , Wheaton's International Law 346 (7th Eng. ed. 1944). 
65 Colombos 467- 68; Higgins, Studies in International Law and Relations 294 
(1928). 
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that this is not an acceptable method of analysis unless novelty is to be 
treated as illegality. It is also difficult to accept such an analysis in view 
of the consistent historical record of acceptance of new methods and 
instruments of war which are militarily efficient.66 
Professor Lauterpacht, after conceding that the long-distance surface 
enforced blockade "could not be squared with the technical requirements 
of the law of blockade as generally accepted," 67 has stated its juridical 
basis: 
[M]easures regularly and uniformly repeated in successive wars in the 
form of reprisals and aiming at the economic isolation of the opposing 
belligerent must be regarded as a development of the latent principle 
of the law of blockade, namely, that the belligerent who possesses 
the effective command of the sea is entitled to deprive his opponent 
of the use thereof for the purpose either of navigation by his own 
vessels or of conveying on neutral vessels such goods as are destined 
to or originate from him.68 
It appears to be no more rational to determine the validity of measures 
enforced by submarines according to the criteria applicable to surface 
warships than to apply the exact criteria applicable to nineteenth-century 
blockades to the modern "long-distance" ones with literally no variations 
or considerations of "latent principle" permitted to accommodate techno-
logical changes. 
Following the successful conclusion of the First World War by the Allied 
powers, it was argued on the stated grounds of humanity that practically 
all of the principal methods of the victors, including the long-distance 
blockade, were illegal.69 The argument emphasized the differences between 
these methods and those employed during the previous century. It was 
not emphasized, of course, that the nineteenth-century methods themselves 
were an outgrowth and development of earlier methods. No attempt was 
made to explain how or why the development and adaptation of the law 
of naval warfare were irrevocably frozen in their nineteenth-century for-
mulations. This type of argument, even assuming its acceptance after the 
60 This historical record is examined in Royse 1-21 and passim. 
67 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht 796. 
68 I d. at 796-97. 
69 Trimble, "Violations of Maritime Law by the Allied Powers during the World 
War," 24 A.].I.L. 79 ( 1930). 
It [the long-distance blockade] violated the three fundamentals of a blockade, as 
was pointed out by the American Secretary of State, because it was not main-
tained at close range; it stopped vessels going to neutral ports; and it left the 
German ports of the Baltic open to the Scandinavian countries, while they were 
closed to other Powers. 
Id. at 93 (footnote omitted.) These conclusions are supported by Baty, "Prize Law 
and Modern Conditions," 25 A.].I.L. 625 ( 1931). 
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war, had no impact on the decision-making process during the war. If the 
argument had been accepted at that time, it seems most improbable that 
it would have affected decision-makers· by compelling a reversion to the 
naval methods of the previous century since those earlier methods were 
no longer feasible from a technological standpoint. 70 The net effect of 
reversion to the nineteenth-century methods would have been foregoing 
the effective use of surface naval power, not to mention losing the war. 
Because of this the almost certain outcome would have been that the 
newer methods would have been continued under the onus of illegality. 
The consequences would have been the enhancement of the attitude that 
international law is inadequate to regulate modern war and an abandon-
ment of all restraints upon naval warfare. Such a decision, or any func-
tionally equivalent one to conduct war outside of law, would hardly 
promote humanitarian objectives. Considering these factors, Professor Lau-
terpacht's appraisal of the long-distanc~. blockade is preferable. In addition, 
a method of legal appraisal which proclaims illegality after the war but 
which has no impact on decision-makers during the war leaves something 
to be desired. 71 This difficulty persists, of course, whether such an in-
adequate appraisal is made concerning surface or submarine methods of 
warfare. 
If Germany had claimed to establish the submarine area as a matter 
of legal right it could have advanced a number of specific arguments. 
British economic warfare against Germany, enforced by surface naval 
power, was an adaptation of the traditional principles of the law of war 
to the changed circumstances of the First World War. In particular, the 
long-distance blockade was a development of the traditional principles 
and could not be regarded as lawful unless technological change were 
accepted as fact and unless consequent doctrinal adaptation and extension 
were accepted as an integral part of the law.72 
Employing precisely the same criteria, Germany could claim that its 
submarine warfare was also an adaptation and extension of the traditional 
principles. This claim, in substance, is analogous to Professor Lauterpacht's 
·appraisal of the long-distance surface blockade quoted above. The sum-
mary way to reject it is to argue that the reasoning is inapplicable to 
submarines. Mr. Colombos has stated: 
[T]he attempt to change existjng principles to the advantage of the 
70 See the text accompanying notes 23-2 7 supra. 
71 It is obvious that the humanitarian objectives of the laws of war must be im-
plemented during the actual war or hostilities. 
72 The lawfulness of the long-range blockade is upheld by Colombos 693- 94; 
Oppenheim-Lauterpacht 796- 97; Garner, "Violations of Maritime Law by the 
Allied Powers During the World War," 25 A.].I.L. 26, 42- 48 ( 1931) (emphasizing 
geographical factors). 
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party which lacks command of the surface of the sea is an attempt 
to avoid the consequences of naval weakness. 73 
In view of the military efficiency manifested by submarines in two World 
Wars, one may doubt the accuracy of the label of "naval weakness." The 
quoted writer has been equally explicit in summarizing modern economic 
warfare enforced by surface vessels: "The economic weapon was thus 
effectively used to throttle the enemy's commerce." 74 In the same context 
of surface naval enforcement he states that, "The annihilation of the 
enemy's commerce is one of the great aims of naval warfare." 75 The 
contrast in such an appraisal of surface and submarine naval warfare 
could lead an observer to suspect a bias against the latter without regard 
to the relative destruction of values actually involved in its use. 
It may be that operational areas, at least for individual submarines, 
could be juridically upheld even by the same standards applicable to surface 
warships. Dr. Royse, after examining the failure of the Hague Conventions 
to restrict the efficient use of surface naval gunfire, states: 
The warship, in a legal sense, thus became a floating battlefield 
carrying with it the same immunity from restrictions as attended land 
operations in the actual combat zone. The exclusive military sphere 
characterizing land operations, in which the principle of utility or 
effectiveness dominated, became similarly operative in any zone oc-
cupied by a belligerent naval vessel. This sphere may be said to have 
followed the warship through all waters in all its war operations. 
Whatever restrictions obtained were concerned, as in land operations, 
with wanton destruction and terrorization. Effective artillery opera-
tions were left unrestricted. 76 
It is not necessary, of course, to rely on this interesting analysis alone 
because of the other considerations which indicate the juridical validity of 
submarine operational areas. 
It is sometimes stated that the vulnerability and other characteristics of 
submarines do not reduce the obligation to comply with the traditional 
doctrinal requirements.77 It must be recalled that even the British, with 
predominant surface naval power, were not able to comply with the tradi-
tional procedures of visit and search at sea.78 It could be persuasively 
maintained, in consequence, that these technologically obsolete procedures 
were no more applicable to submarine warships. Before resorting to "un-
restricted" submarine warfare in 1917, the argument would stress, Germany 
73 Colombos 470. 
7~ I d. at 707. 
75 I d. at 509-10. 
76 Royse 164 (footnote omitted). 
77 Colombos 469-70; 1· Garner 3 77-80. 
78 The technique of diversion of merchant ships was adopted because of the im-
practicability of visit and search at sea: See the text accompanying note 22 supra. 
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actually attempted VISit and search by submarines and this was proven 
unworkable in the light of the new technology in general and the methods 
of warfare employed by British merchant ships in particular.79 
The relative destructiveness of particular methods of stopping commerce 
with the enemy belligerent should be more important criteria to determine 
lawfulness than compliance with obsolete procedures.80 The intermediate 
sanctioning devices employed for the long-distance blockade consisted of 
the navicert system, diversion of ships to ports for adequate searches, com-
pliance with bunker controls, and similar methods. 81 The ultimate sanction 
applied to merchant vessels which failed to acquiesce in the intermediate 
sanctions and persisted in attempting to run the blockade was gunfire from 
surface naval vessels. 82 It is well established even under the traditional law 
that a merchant vessel which refuses to stop when ordered to do so may be 
attacked by a belligerent warship. 83 The refusal by a merchant ship to 
comply with the warning involved in· a proclaimed submarine operational 
area, in view of the changes in naval technology, may be said to be tanta-
mount to persistent refusal to stop when ordered to do so by a surface 
warship. In this context, there is no reason why torpedo attack without 
further warning than that involved in a specified and notified operational 
area should be regarded as more destructive of neutral human and material 
values than gunfire from surface warships. 
The German submarine operational area is also reasonable in other 
respects. The notice concerning the area issued to neutral states enchanced 
the military effectiveness of the area in interdicting commerical intercourse 
between the United Kingdom and the neutrals.84 At the same time the 
notice was designated to minimize destruction of neutral values by encour-
aging or coercing the neutrals to keep their merchant ships out of the 
operational area. The central importance of the economic objective in 
79 See the text accompanying notes 51, 56, and 57 supra. 
80 See McDougal & Feliciano 494. 
81 These sanctions were highly effective. 1 & 2 Medlicott passim. 
82 This was the ultimate sanction even though the traditional texts only list capture 
as a sanction for breach of blockade. See, e.g.~ Oppenh~im-Lauterpacht 788-89. The 
same text reveals no hesitancy in allowing an attack on a merchant ship if the attack 
is in response to a refusal to submit to visit. See infra note 83. 
83 
"Enemy merchantmen may be attacked only if they refuse to submit to visit 
after having been duly signalled to do so." Oppenheim-Lauterpacht 466-67 (footnotes 
omitted). 
84 Compare the comprehensive character of commerce interdiction sanctioned by 
surface naval power: 
It is now not only a case of blockade, it is a case of shutting down German 
commerce the world over, so far as we are able to do it. 
De Montmorency, "The Black List," 3 Grotius Trans. 23, 34 ( 1917) . 
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general war to both surface and submarine naval powers also supports 
the conclusion of the reason~bleness of the submarine area.85 
Appraisal of the German submarine operations area as a claim of right 
should also be made in terms of its impact upon neutrals. Although termed 
"neutrals," it must be recalled that some neutrals, and particularly the 
United States, were engaged in the large and profitable trade of supplying 
war material to Germany's principal enemies but not to Germany.86 In 
view of the general character of the war situation and of the crucial im-
portance of economic warfare, the belligerent interest in maintenance of 
the operational area must be deemed to outweigh by far the neutral interest 
in trade with one group of belligerents. The neutral interest thus overcome, 
it should be emphasized, is not the mere maintenance of the former peace-
time trade but rather the development of a greatly expanded wartime 
trade. 87 
For these further reasons, the German submarine operational area of the 
First World War must be upheld as a lawful claim of right. In summary, 
the outcome of the decision-making process in the First World War was 
the development of expectations of uniformity and rightness of the kind 
usually described as customary law. This customary law upholds as reason-
able and lawful both the long-distance surface blockade and the submarine 
operational area. It should be added that the interwar period produced 
no international agreement specifically designed to outlaw submarine 
operational areas. 
85 
"It would appear that recourse to this practice [submarine operational areas], 
because of fundamental belligerent rights, cannot be opposed." Mori, The Submarine 
in War: A Study of Relevant Rules and Problems 172 ( 1931). 
86 From June 30, 1914, to June 30, 1917, the United States shipped $506,674,000 
worth of gunpowder and $665,237,000 in other explosives. 
Buehrig 89 (footnotes omitted). The quoted figures do not include firearms, cart-
ridges, and various metals. Prof. Buehrig states that as to all of these (except copper-
277% increase): 
[T]he increase over the three-year period 1911-13 was so extreme as to indicate 
that before _ the war the countries in question imported these commodities from 
the United States in only negligible quantities. 
Ibid. 
87 If the neutrals had in reality been content to continue their normal peace- · 
time trade, many of the conflicts with the belligerents would not have taken 
place and the law of neutrality might have been shaped quite differently. 
Jessup, 4 Neutrality: Its History~ Economics and Law (val. 4 is additionally entitled 
Today and Tomorrow) 23 ( 1936). 
They have sought to grasp the momentary inflated profits of the war boom, 
unwilling to hold themselves down to a normal economic life even in so far as 
normality is possible under such circumstances. Their compaints, their quarrels 
with the belligerents and their frequently resulting involvement in the war, have 
resulted from their insistence upon entering the economic conflict. 
!d. at 34. 
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b. THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
On November 24, 1939 the German Government made its first 
submarine area claim of the new war in a note to several of the maritime 
neutral states.88 The note was not sent to the United States which barred 
its citizens, ships, and aircraft from a combat zone which included a large 
area off the European west coast.89 The note pointed out the existence 
of the United States combat zone as well as the alleged use of enemy 
merchant ships for aggressive purposes and stated that these matters caused 
the German Government: 
to warn anew and more strongly that in view of the fact that the 
actions are carried on with all the technical means of modern war-
fare, and in view of the fact that these actions are increasing in the 
waters around the British Isles and near the French coast, these waters 
can no longer be considered safe for neutral shipping.90 
Admiral Donitz's counsel, Flottenrichter Kranzbuhler, described the op-
erational area and its effect to the International Military Tribunal as 
follows: 
The note then recommends as shipping lanes between neutral 
powers certain sea routes which are not endangered by German naval 
warfare and, furthermore, recommends legislative measures according 
to the example set by the United States. In concluding, the Reich 
Government rejects responsibility for any consequences which might 
follow if warning and recommendation should not be complied with. 
This note constituted the announcement of an operational area equi-
valent in size to the U.S.A. combat zone, with the specified limitation 
that only in those sea zones which were actually endangered by actions 
against the enemy consideration could no longer be given to neutral 
shipping. 91 
On August 17, 1940, following its victory over France and the low 
countries, Germany made another operational area claim in a note to 
neutrals not including the United States.92 It was described by Kranz-
hubler as "a declaration in which the entire area of the U.S.A. combat 
zone around England without any limitation was designated as an opera-
tional area." 93 It provided in part: 
The German Government assumes no responsibility for damage 
88 18 I.M.T. 327. 
89 Authority· for the combat zone was provided in the Neutrality Act of 1939, 54 
Stat. 4, 7 ( 1939). A chart depicting the United States zone is in 1 Medlicott 334. 
The combat zone was a municipal measure applicable only to United States citizens, 
vessels and aircraft. 
90 18 I.M.T. 328. 
91 Ibid. 
92 I d. at 328-29. 
93 Ibid. 
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to ships or injury to persons which may befall them in this area.94 
As the result of the developments which the war has taken during 
the last weeks England has been brought into the center of the war 
activities at sea and in the air. In the sea area surrounding the British 
Isles constant war action is consequently from now on to be expected 
which makes it impossible for merchant ships to pass through this 
sea area without running serious risks. The entire sea area around the 
British Isles has therefore become a combat zone. Every vessel which 
passes through this area is exposed to destruction not only by mines 
but also by other weapons. The German Government therefore most 
urgently renews its warning to neutral shipping against passing 
through the danger zone . . . . 
Apparently this later German claim did not provide for safe shipping 
routes between neutral states as the earlier one did. 
Appraisal 
It should be noted that the earlier claim of November 24, 1939 
does not, in substance, go beyond that in the German "unrestricted" 
submarine zone of February 1, 1917.95 The factual conditions of the 
naval war situation during the Second World War were basically similar 
to those of the First World War and included another Allied long-
distance blockade. The importance of the economic objective in general 
war was not reduced.96 The same legal analysis employed in appraisal of 
the German claim of February 1, 1917 also justifies the conclusion of the 
lawfulness of the present claim. The International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg, however, reached a decision which is in significant part in-
consistent with this conclusion.97 
Assuming that the claim of August 1 7, 1940 did not provide for safe 
routes between neutrals for genuine interneutral trade and that it was 
practicable to do this, it is concluded that the claim is not justified in 
law in this respect. The issue as to whether or not it is consistent with 
law to prevent neutral trade with the opposing belligerent by the use of a 
submarine operational area has been considered in connection with the 
94 6 Hackworth 485-86; it is also quoted less fully and with slight variations in 
wording in 18 I.M.T. 329. 
"War zone" declarations enforced by either surface or submarine naval power are 
collected in U.S. Naval War College, International Law Documents 1943 51-67 
( 1945) and U.S. Naval War College, International Law Documents 1940 44-52 
( 1942). What is apparently a German propaganda version of the claim quoted in 
the text appears in id. at 46-50. 
95 See the text at note 46 supra. 
96 See generally 1 & 2 Medlicott. 
tn I.M.T. 311-13. 
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claim of February 1, 1917.98 It will be considered further with the other 
issues raised before the International Military Tribunal.99 
Admiral Donitz was indicted before the International Military Tribunal 
for, inter alia, "waging unrestricted submarine warfare contrary to the 
NavaL Protocol of 1936." 100 In support of this claim, the prosecution con-
tended: 
Nor need we take time to examine the astonishing proposition that 
the sinking of neutral shipping was legalized by the process of making 
a paper order excluding such neutral ships not from some definite 
war zone over which Germany exercised control but from vast areas 
of the seas. For there is one matter at least about which nobody 
questions or puts questions to the law.101 
This statement reflects adequately the prosecution's view of operational 
areas. In its opinion such areas Gould only be lawfully claimed by a 
belligerent exercising effective "control.'' Since Germany did not meet this 
requirement, in spite of highly effective and almost decisive submarine 
enforcement of the area, one is led to conclude that only a surface naval 
power could exercise "control" in this restricted sense. In substance the 
prosecution submitted that the German claim, because based upon sub-
marine control and enforcement, was only a "paper order" 102 and the 
claim of its legality as to neutrals an "astonishing proposition." 
It was argued in behalf of Admiral Donitz that consideration was ex-
tended to neutrals in the conduct of submarine warfare as long as it was 
possible.103 Article 74 of the German Prize Law of 1939 incorporated the 
substance of the Protocol of 1936.104 Flottenrichter Kranzbuhler empha-
sized that this Ordinance was carried out by German submarines for the 
first few weeks of the war until the enemy made it impossible. In his 
words: 
Why was this practice not kept up? Because the conduct of the enemy 
98 See the text accompanying notes 86, 87 supra. 
99 See the text accompanying notes 121-27 infra. 
100 1 I.M.T. 311. 
The "Naval [or Submarine] Protocol of 1936" is the same as the Proces-Verbal of 
1936 and both, in substance, are the same as art. 22 of the London Naval Treaty of 
1930. See note 114 infra for full citation. 
101 Stated by Sir Hartley Shawcross. 19 I.M.T. 469. 
102 The "paper order" or ''paper blockade" terminology was used historically to 
refer to a traditional blockade supported by insufficient naval power to meet the 
requirement of effectiveness. See Hall, The Law of Naval Warfare 198-99 (2nd rev. 
ed. 1921). 
103 18 I.M.T. 314, 326- 27. 
104 The German Prize Law Code of Aug. 28, 1939 art. 74 is quoted in 7 Hackworth 
248. 
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made such a procedure militarily impossible, and at the same time 
created the legal prerequisites for it~ modification.105 
The claim of reprisal could, of course, be invoked again as it was in 
the earlier general war. Because of British and American departures from 
the strict interpretation of the traditional law 106 the German submarine 
operational area may again be justified as a legitimate reprisal. It could 
be argued in favor of such an approach that reprisals have actually been 
used as a legislative device to bring the law up to date with modern 
technological realities.107 Because of the facility of successfully invoking 
reprisals, however, a more fundamental appraisal should be made. In 
addition, it is simply not credible that the militarily efficient use of modern 
naval power, whether surface, submarine, or air, is entirely dependent 
upon the commission of illegalities by the opposing belligerent.108 
At the time of the proclamation of the German submarine operational 
area of August 17, 1940 the following facts confronted the German naval 
command according to Kranz buhler: 
( 1) A legal trade between the neutrals and the British Isles no 
longer existed. On the grounds of the German answers to the British 
stipulations concerning contraband goods and the British export 
blockade, any trade to and from England was contraband trade and 
therefore illegal from the point of view of international law. 
(2) The neutrals in practice submitted to all British measures, even 
when these measures were contrary to their own interests and their 
own conception of legality. 
( 3) Thus, the neutrals directly supported British warfare, for by 
submitting to the British control system in their own country they 
permitted the British Navy to economize considerably on fighting 
forces which, according to the hitherto existing international law, 
should have exercised trade control at sea and which were now avail-
able for other war tasks.109 
105 18 I.M.T. 314. 
106 The British Admiralty assumed effective control over British merchant shipping 
on Aug. 26, 1939 just before the start of World War II. Roskill 35. By March 1941, 
the Admiralty had overcome the initial shortage and fitted 3,434 merchant ships with 
antisubmarine guns. Id. at 47. 
107 See McDougal & Feliciano 675. 
108 See the remarkable account of the background of the British Reprisals Order in 
Council of Nov. 27, 1939 in 1 Medlicott 112-14. One may receive the impression 
that the British urgent need for effective economic warfare was so great that if 
reprisal were not available another ground would have been invoked. In addition, 
the careful long-range planning of economic warfare between the World Wars in-
dicated unequivocally that it was to be considerably more than an occasional reprisal 
response to enemy illegality. 1 Medlicott 12-24. 
109 18 I.M.T. 335. 
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Because of these facts, in Kranzbuhler's view, there was no reason for 
the German Government to give preference to the neutrals over German 
military needs "in determining its operational area with a view to pre-
venting illegal traffic from reaching England." 110 He also pointed out 
that the neutral ships traveling to England, in spite of German warnings~ 
underwent a great risk for the purpose of earning a high profit.111 
The judgment of the Tribunal, after stating that it "is not prepared to 
hold Donitz guilty for his conduct of submarine warfare against British 
armed merchant ships," 112 continued: 
However, the proclamation of operational zones and the sinking of 
neutral merchant vessels which enter those zones presents a different 
question. This practice was employed in the war of 1914-1918 by 
Germany and adopted in retaliation by Great Britain. The Washing-
ton Conference of 1922, the London Naval Agreement of 1930, and 
the Protocol of 1936 were entered i;nto with full knowledge that such 
zones had been employed in the First World War. Yet the Protocol 
made no exception for operational zones. The order of Donitz to sink 
neutral ships without warning when found within these zones was, 
therefore, in the opinion of the Tribunal, a violation of the Protocol.113 
The "Protocol of 1936" is, in substance, the same as article 22 of the 
London Naval Treaty of 1930 and provides: 
( 1) In their action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must 
conform to the rules of international law to which surface vessels are 
subject. 
( 2) In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on 
being duly summoned, or of active resistance to visit or search , a 
warship, whether surface vessel or submarine, may not sink or render 
incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without having first placed 
passengers, crew and ship's papers in a place of safety. For this pur-
pose the ship's boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless the 
safety of the passengers and crew is assured, in the existing sea and 
weather conditions, by the p roximity of land, or the presence of 
another vessel which is in a position to take them on board.114 
110 Ibid. 
111 I bid. 
llll 1 I .M .T . 312. 
113 Id . at 312- 13. 
114 T he "Protocol of 1936" or the "Proces-Verbal Relating to the Rules of Sub-
marine Warfare Set Forth in Part IV of the Treaty of London of April 22, 1930" 
contains the identical rules set forth in the London Naval Treaty Part IV (art. 22) 
and quoted in the text. Art. 23 of the London Naval Treaty provided, "Part IV 
shall remain in force without limit of time" (the rest of the Treaty expired on Dec. 
31, 1936). In the Proces-Verbal the parties to the London Naval Treaty invited 
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The second paragraph of the Protocol states two exceptions to the rules: 
"persistent refusal to stop on being duly summoned" and "active resistance 
to visit or search." The Tribunal's conclusion that "the Protocol made no 
exception for operational zones" necessarily involves the interpretation 
that the stated exceptions precluded the existence of others, and that the 
stated ones did not cover the situation of a submarine operational area 
being the functional equivalent of the stated exceptions. The Tribunal's 
conclusion appears to be an example of mechanical interpretation or 
literalism.115 There is no indication that the Tribunal gave careful con-
sideration to the alternative interpretation that the Protocol was inappli-
cable in operational areas since there was no international agreement on 
this subject. Such an interpretation was advanced by Kranzbuhler 116 and 
it is at the very least as plausible as the interpretation selected by the 
Tribunal. It is more plausible if the operational area is evaluated as too 
important to be dealt with by implication. 
The ambiguities of the Protocol suggest that its rational interpretation, 
that is ascertaining the probable intended meaning of the parties based 
on all relevant evidence,117 is more difficult than the Tribunal seemed to 
appreciate. Among the ambiguities are the term "merchant ships" in the 
first paragraph and the term "a merchant vessel" in the second para-
graph.118 The Tribunal interpreted these terms as excluding "British 
armed merchant ships." 119 It recognized that the British Admiralty con-
voyed merchant ships and directed them to send position reports upon 
sighting submarines, "thus integrating merchant vessels into the warning 
other states to agree to Part IV (art. 22). Forty-nine states adhere to it including 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and United States. 
Dept of State, Treaties in Force 292 ( 1966). 
The London Naval Treaty Part IV (art. 22) is in 46 Stat. 2858, 2881-82 ( 1931); 
2 Hackworth 691; 6 Hackworth 466. 
The Proces-Verbal or Protocol of 1936 is in 31 A.].I.L. Supp. Official Docs. 137-39 
( 193 7) ; 7 Hackworth 248. 
115 The process of interpretation, rightly conceived, cannot be regarded as a 
mere mechanical one of drawing inevitable meanings from the words in a text, 
or of searching for and discovering some preexisting specific intention of the 
parties with respect to every situation arising under a treaty. 
Harvard Research, Treaties 946. 
116 18 I.M.T. 330. 
117 The Harvard Research, Treaties 93 7 (art. 19 (a)) employs interpretation in 
the light of the general purpose to be served by the treaty. The Harvard Research 
is quoted in relevant part in the text of Ch. IV, section B. The same approach to 
interpretation appears in American Law Institute, Restatement of the Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the United States section 14 7 ( 1965). 
118 Compare Prof. Morison who describes the Treaty as "perfectly explicit" in 1 
History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II: The Battle of the 
Atlantic 8 ( 194 7). 
119 1 I.M.T. 312. 
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network of naval intelligence." 120 The references to merchant ships in 
the Protocol could, with consistency, have been interpreted as not appli-
cable to any vessel including neutrals so integrated into the British warning 
network. 
The Tribunal, however, found Admiral Donitz guilty of a violation of 
the Protocol in the sinking of "neutral merchant vessels" which entered 
the submarine operational areas.121 The term "neutral merchant vessels" 
is more precise than the language concerning merchant vessels in the Pro-
tocol but it is not self-defining. The broad term "neutral merchant vesssels" 
comprises at least two distinct categories. The first covers those which are 
engaged in genuine interneutral trade and do not contribute to the eco-
nomic war resources of the belligerents. The second consists of those neutral 
vessels which, through acqui~sc~nce or coercion, participate in the navicert 
system and the other modalities of the surface long-distance blockade.122 
Although the ambiguous term "neutral" covers both categories, it is 
obvious that the functional economic differences between them are much 
greater than any similarities. The category of neutral vessels possessing 
British navicerts, 123 ship navicerts, 124 or ship warrants, 125 actively coopera-
ted in British economic warfare measures. The real issue before the Tri-
bunal, in view of the fundamental importance of naval economic warfare 
in general war, was whether this second category of "neutrals" were so 
functionally a part of British and Allied economic warfare that they could 
lawfully be accorded the same treatment as that accorded to belligerent 
merchant ships. The Tribunal's invocation of the ambiguity "neutral 
merchant vessels" enabled it to avoid making the difficult analysis of this 
fundamental issue. 
Professor Medlicott has now provided the kind of factual material which 
is relevant to resolving the issue: 
120 Ibid. 
m. 1 I.M.T. 313. 
122 Under questioning by the chief British prosecutor, Admiral Donitz used a land 
warfare analogy in connection with such neutral vessels: "For instance, no considera-
tion would be shown on land either to a neutral truck convoy bringing ammunition 
or supplies to the enemy." 13 l.M.T. 365. 
123 A navicert was a "commercial passport" issued by the British Government "in 
respect of any consignment which did not appear liable to seizure as contraband." 
1 Medlicott 94. See generally 7 Hackworth 212-17; Ritchie, The ((Navicert" System 
During the World War ( 1938). 
1
2i A ship navic~rt was issued when the entire cargo was covered by navicerts and 
was "intended to minimize further the formalities of visit and search." 1 Medlicott 
96-97. 
125 The ship warrant was a document issued to each neutral ship whose owner 
had given satisfactory undertakings to do what the British Government required. 
The shipowner undertook to comply with economic-warfare regulations .... 
1 Medlicott 442- 43. 
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It must always be remembered that the ship-warrant system was of 
importance not only for economic-warfare purposes, but also for the 
securing of tonnage and for the furthering of other sides of Allied 
shipping policy.126 
In view of the functional naval economic warfare equivalence of these 
"neutral merch~nt vessels" with British merchant vessels, it is reasonable 
and lawful to accord them the same treatment in submarine operational 
areas which the Tribunal approved in the situation of British merchant 
ships. This resolution of the issue is formulated in somewhat narrower 
terms than a conclusion of Professor Lauterpacht concerning the same 
general subject matter: 
[T]he experience of the two World Wars has shown that that substan-
tial aspect of the traditional law of neutrality which centres around 
the neutral rights of commerce and intercourse generally has become 
obsolete to a large extent. In modern war in which the military and 
economic aspects of the national effort are inextricably interwoven, 
the concessions which the belligerent is in the position to make to 
neutral commerce are very narrowly circumscribed.127 
There is at least one other factor which should have led the Tribunal 
to accept Kranzbuhler's interpretation of the Protocol. Deference to well-
known principles of criminal law due process would have required the 
Tribunal to resolve the ambiguities of the Protocol in Admiral Donitz' 
favor since it was applied to him as a criminal statute.128 
Since the Tribunal provided no reasoned basis, other than its improbable 
interpretation of the Protocol, for its conclusion that the sinking of "neu-
tral" merchant ships in the submarine enforced operational area was illegal, 
a further inquiry should be made for possible reasons. In looking outside 
the judgment itself, there is a significant colloquy between Lord Justice 
Lawrence, the President, and Admiral Donitz' counsel. 
THE PRESIDENT: One minute. Dr. Kranzbuhler, does not the right 
126 1 Medlicott 443. 
It is not surprising that the view of the German Supreme Prize Tribunal was tha~: 
[T]he introduction of ships' warrants is a measure of economic warfare, with 
the express purpose of getting to the greatest extent under British control those 
ships which were not yet in British hands. 
The Ole Wegger, [1943-45] Annual Digest 532, 535 (No. 193). 
127 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht 642. The passage quoted continues by stating that it 
is difficult "to visualize the nature of the principle" involved. 
128 [A criminal] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in 
terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its 
meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process 
of law. 
Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). 
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to declare a certain zone as an operational zone depend upon the power 
to enforce it? 
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: I do not quite follow the 
point-of your question. 
THE PRESIDEN'T: Well, your contention is, apparently, that any state 
at war has a right to declare such an operational zone as it thinks right 
and in accordance with its interest, and what I was asking you was whether 
the right to declare an operational zone, if there is such a right, does not 
depend upon the ability or power of the state declaring the zone to enforce 
that zone, to prevent any ships coming into it without being either captured 
or shot. 
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: I do not believe, Mr. Presi-
dent, that there exists agreement of expert opinion regarding that question. 
In contrast to the blockade zone in a classical sense where full effect is 
necessary, the operational zone only provides for practical endangering 
through continuous combat actions. This practical threat was present in 
the German operational zone in my opinion, and I refer in that connection 
to the proclamation of President Roosevelt regarding the U.S.A. combat 
zone, where the entering of that zone was prohibited, because as a result 
of combat actions shipping must of necessity be continuously endan-
gered.129 
* * * * * * * 
THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean, then, that you are basing the power 
of the state to declare a certain zone as an operational zone not upon the 
power of the state to enforce its orders in that zone, but upon the pos-
sibility of danger in that zone? 
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Yes 
THE PRESIDENT: You say it depends upon the possibility of danger 
in the zone? 
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: I would not say the possibility 
of danger, Mr. President, but the probability of danger, and the impossi-
bility for the belligerent to protect neutral shipping against this danger.130 
The President's view, as strongly suggested in his questions, is that the 
power to legally establish an operational area is based upon the ability 
"to enforce that zone." The questions directed to Kranzbuhler indicate 
that the questioner did not believe that Germany had such power of 
enforcement, or "control," as the prosecution put it. The questions, there-
fore, appear to indicate full judicial agreement with the prosecution claim 
129 18 l.M.T. 332-33. 
130 I d. at 333. 
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that the legal requirements of enforcement or control could not be met 
by "a paper order" and submarine enforcement.131 Unfortunately, Kranz-
hubler did not respond to the express statements in the questions and 
demonstrate their juridical inadequacy. Whether the quoted questions 
actually reveal the reasoning which was persuasive to the Tribunal or not, 
it is clear that the decision of the Tribunal is at least consistent with this 
reasoning. 
c. CLAIMS TO ESTABLISH RESCUE ZONES OF 
IMMUNITY 
Two of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 provide for the ad hoc 
creation of hospital zones and localities of immunity in land warfare.132 
These humanitarian provisions are designed to protect the wounded and 
the sick as well as civilian persons from some of the effects of war. There 
appears to be no sufficient reason why analogous zones for rescue purposes 
should not be established on the high seas in time of war. 
As a mat~er of fact, a German U-boat captain and Admiral Donitz 
did attempt to establish such a rescue zone during the Second World War. 
Captain Roskill, the historian of the British Navy, has described the facts 
as follows: 
In September, 1942, a group of [four] U-boats and a 'milch cow' 
(as the Germans called their supply submarines) arrived south of the 
equator, and there on the 12th U.l56 sank the homeward-bound 
troopship Laconia, which had 1,800 Italian prisoners on board. On 
learning from survivors what he had done Hartenstein, the U-boat's 
captain, sent a series of messages en clair calling for help in the rescue 
work and promising immunity to ships sent to the scene, provided 
that he himself was not attacked.133 
Captain Roskill has also stated that: "Donitz ordered other [U-]boats 
to go to the rescue, and the Vichy Government was asked to send help 
from Dakar." 134 The U -boats initiated and took the principal role in the 
rescue operations including towing lifeboats toward the African coast, and 
Vichy French warships joined in the rescue work. During the four days 
involved in the rescue work the submarines were, of course, diverted fro!? 
their normal wartime operations. The British Navy ordered two ships to 
proceed to the scene and assist. Roskill's account continues: 
All went well until the next afternoon [Sept. 16] when an American 
Army aircraft from the newly established base on Ascension Island 
131 See the text at supra note 101. 
132 Convention Concerning Wounded and Sick in the Field, art. 23; Convention 
Concerning Civilian Persons, art. 14. 
133 Roskill 224. 
134 2 Roskill, The War at Sea 1939-1945: The Pe,riod of Balance 210-11 (1956). 
arrived, flew around the surfaced U -boats for about an hour, and 
then attacked U.l56 with bombs. It is as impossible to justify that 
act as it is difficult to explain why it was committed.135 
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The Historical Division of the U.S. Air Force has stated concerning 
this incident: 
A summary of operations from Ascension Island states that on the 
morning of 16 September 1942 a B-24 of the US Army Air Forces 
sighted a submarine at 5 degrees South, 11 degrees 40 minutes West. 
The sub, which was towing two life boats and was in the process of 
picking up two more, was displaying a white flag with a red cross. 
The sub did not show a national flag when challenged by the B-24. 
The plane left the scene and contacted Ascension. Since no friendly 
subs were known to be in the area, the plane was instructed to 
attack.136 
In making an appraisal in 1960, Captain Roskill has written: 
To-day two things seem clear. The first is that throughout the days 
following the torpedoing of the troopship, Hartenstein and the other 
U-boat captains involved behaved with marked humanity towards 
the survivors, doing their utmost to rescue friends and foes alike; and 
the second is that, on the Allied side, whoever sent the order to the 
aircraft to bomb the U-boat committed a serious blunder.137 
It should be stated that the order to bomb the submarine was worse 
than "a serious blunder." In addition, the aircraft commander who car-
ried out the order must have known the actual facts after flying "around 
the surfaced U -boats for about an hour," and been aware that the order 
was not based on an accurate understanding of the situation. 
Following the bombing incident, Admiral Donitz issued orders to the 
submarines to stop the rescue attempt.138 Had it not been for the bomb-
ing, the attempt to establish the rescue zone of immunity in an area large 
enough to effectuate the rescue probably would have been successful. As 
it was, many of the personnel of the Laconia, including Italian prisoners 
of war and British passengers, were rescued because of the actions of 
135 Roskill 224-25. 
136 Excerpt of letter from Historical Division, U.S.A.F. to Mr. David D. Lewis (Apr. 
12, 1960). The excerpted letter appears as an enclosure to letter from Director, Re-
search Studies Institute, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., to President, 
Naval War College, Newport R. I. (Apr. 19, 1961). The excerpted letter is quoted 
more extensively in Lewis, The Fight for the Sea: The Past~ Present~ and Future 
of Submarine Warfare in the Atlantic ( 1961) at 179 and at 180, first full sentence 
(without indication it is a continuation of quotation from prior page) . 
137 Roskill 225. 
138 13 I.M.T. 285- 87. On Sept. 17, 1942 Donitz issued the "Laconia Order." 18 
l.M.T. 348. It is appraised substantively inCh. IV, section B. 
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Hartenstein and Donitz.139 There can be no doubt but that the rescue 
attempt was consistent with the highest humanitarian traditions even 
though there is no indication that the International Military Tribunal 
gave credit for it. Since a preeminent objective of the laws of war is to 
prevent unnecessary loss of life, rescue zones of immunity on the high seas 
should be honored and implemented by belligerent and neutral states alike 
in future naval wars. 
2. United Kingdom Claims 
During the Second World War the United Kingdom usually enjoyed 
surface naval predominance over Germany. Apparently Germany enjoyed 
such surface naval predominanc~ in the Skagerrak and Kattegat at the 
time of the invasion of Norway. Beginning on April 9, 1940 the British 
Government removed the restrictions on its submarines concerning attacks 
upon merchant ships east of eight degrees East.140 On May 8, 1940 the 
British First Lord of the Admiralty announced in the House of Commons: 
Therefore we limited our operations in the Skagerrak to the sub-
marines. In order to make this work as effective as possible, the usual 
restrictions which v;e have imposed on the actions of our submarines 
were relaxed. As I told the House, all German ships by day and all 
ships by night were to be sunk as opportunity served.141 
Appraisal 
It was highly unlikely that any neutral ships were sailing in the Skager-
rak (Jutland) and Kattegat area at the time the British relaxed their 
"usual restrictions" on submarine operations. Consequently, the issues 
concerning neutral merchant vessels in the submarine area do not appear 
to exist as a practical matter. Nevertheless, the phrase "all German ships 
by day" indicates that the British undertook to discriminate between 
German ships and others, presumably neutrals, in the area in the daylight 
hours. The category "all German ships" presents no legal issues as to 
German warships, including naval auxiliaries, since they may be sunk 
lawfully without warning whether in or out of an operational area. It is 
most probable that the German merchant ships in the category were 
either armed or otherwise participating in the German naval war efforf. 
The sinking of such ships without warning would be upheld as lawful 
even according to the decision of the International Military Tribunal in 
the case of Admiral Donitz.142 
139 In addition to the Roskill books cited supra see Peillard, The Laconia Affair 
(Coburn transl. 1963). 
140 Gilbert, "British Submarine Operations in World War II," 89 Nav. Inst. Proc. 
No. 3, p. 73, 74 ( 1963); Macintyre, Narvik 65 (Amer. ed. 1960). 
141 13 I.M.T. 453-54. 
142 1 l.M.T. 312. 
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In spite of the high improbability of neutral ships in the British sub-
marine operational area, the phrase "all ships by night" includes the claim 
to sink neutral ships in the Skagerrak and Kattegat during the hours of 
darkness. Based on its decision in the case of Admiral Donitz, the Tribunal 
would deem this claim directed at neutrals to be unlawful.143 It should be 
appraised as lawful where the neutral ships were participating in German 
economic warfare. The reasons for this conclusion have been stated in the 
criticism of the decision concerning neutral ships participating in the oppos-
ing belligerent's economic warfare in the case of Admiral Donitz.144 In 
summary, the same legal appraisal which upheld the lawfulness of the 
German submarine operational areas in both World Wars provides an 
ample juridical basis for upholding the British claim in the Skagerrak 
and Kattegat. 
3. United States Claims 
' ' 
On December 7, 1941 the United States Chief of Naval Operations 
sent a secret message to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet which 
stated: 
EXECUTE AGAINST JAPAN UNRESTRICTED AIR AND 
SUBMARINE WARFARE.145 
The message made no specification of the extent of the operational area 
in which "unrestricted" warfare was to take place but it is probable, in 
view of the command held by the addressee and the actual practice, that 
it was the Pacific Ocean areas. This interpretation is supported by answers 
given by Admiral Nimitz on May 11, 1946 to interrogatories put to him on 
behalf of Admiral Donitz at the request of the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg: 
2. Q. Did the U.S.A. in her sea warfare against Japan announce 
certain waters to be areas of operation, blockade, danger, 
restriction, warning or the like? 
143 ld. at 313. 
1~ See the text at notes 121-27 supra. 
To criticize particular parts of the judgment of the International Military Tri-
bunal at Nuremberg is not, of course, th_e same as making a sweeping attack on war 
crimes trials in general. There is reason to believe that such trials incorporating 
basic standards of fairness are better than possible alternative courses of action in-
cluding executing the accused without trial. For an effective answer to recommenda-
tions to execqte accused personnel without trial see Jackson, "The United Nations 
Organization and War Crimes Trials," 46 A.S.I.L. Proc. 196, 199-200 ( 1952). 
145 The text of the message is taken from a photographic copy of the original. The 
message was declassified on Dec. 2, 1960. It was also sent to other military addresses 
in the Pacific and further stated: "CINCAF INFORM BRITISH AND DUTCH. 
INFORM ARMY." 
Since the message was secret it could not have notified neutrals of the submarine 
opera tiona I area. 
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A. Yes. For the purpose of command of operations against Japan 
the Pacific Ocean areas were declared a theater of operations. 
3. Q. If yes, was it customary in such areas for submarines to attack 
merchantmen without warning with the exception of her own 
and those of her Allies? 
A. Yes, with the exception of hospital ships and other vessels under 
'safe conduct' voyages for humanitarian purposes. 
4. Q. Were you under orders to do so? 
A. The Chief of Naval Operations on 7 December 1941 ordered 
unrestricted submarine warfare against J apan.146 
Appraisal 
One of the most obvious aspects of "the Pacific Ocean areas" is 
their great geographical extent. Considering the factual characteristics of 
the Pacific war, the area of the Pacific Ocean is not an unreasonable 
extent for the United States submarine operational area.147 It is therefore 
not persuasive to argue that the United States operational area is illegal 
because of its size. 
In its judgment in the case of Admiral Donitz the International Military 
Tribunal dealt with United Kingdom and United States submarine opera-
tional areas in the following paragraph: 
In view of all of the facts proved and in particular of an order of 
the British Admiralty announced on 8 May 1940, according to which 
all vessels should be sunk at night in the Skagerrak, and the answocs 
to interrogatories by Admiral Nimitz stating that unrestricted sub-
marine warfare was carried on in the Pacific Ocean by the United 
States from the first day that Nation entered the war, the sentence 
of Donitz is not assessed on the ground of his breaches of the inter-
national law of submarine warfare.148 
In substance this is a holding that Admiral Donitz, although guilty of 
violating the Protocol as to "neutral" vessels in operational areas, will not 
be punished in this respect because of what the Tribunal supposed to be 
similar submarine operational area warfare conducted by the United 
Kingdom and the United States.149 
146 40 l.M.T. 108, 109 (Document Donitz-100); the same interrogation is read 
into the record of the proceedings in 17 I.M.T. 378- 81. 
147 It is easier, a fortiori, to uphold the reasonableness of the geographic extent of 
the smaller German opera tiona! areas. 
148 1 l.M.T. 313. 
149 The same conclusion is reached in Robertson, "Submarine Warfare," JAG]. 3, 8 
(Nov. 1956). Compare Smith 212- 13: 
The only inference which can be drawn from the passages quoted is that a war 
crime ceases to be punishable if the defense can prove that similar action was 
taken on the victorious side. 
For a characterization of the Donitz judgment as "confused" see Johnson, Book 
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As demonstrated above in appraisal of the German Second World War 
claims, those claims, and the warfare conducted under them, extended to 
the sinking of neutral merchant ships as well as enemy ones. It has also 
been pointed out that British submarine warfare in the Skagerrak and 
Kattegat did not extend to neutrals as a practical matter. In the same way, 
the Pacific Ocean areas were not frequented by neutral shipping after 
December 7, 1941. If there was a limited commerce conducted by neutral 
Soviet Union vessels during the Pacific war, both Japan 150 and the United 
States, the principal naval belligerents, were interested in avoiding attacks 
upon such vessels.151 In any event, it is clear that the United States "un-
restricted submarine warfare" in the Pacific was conducted without neutral 
involvement.152 Consequently, United States submarine operational area 
warfare in the Pacific does not raise issues concerning its legality as applied 
to either genuine interneutral trade or to neutral vessels participating in 
the enemy economic warfare. 
Since no legal issue is presented by the application of the United States 
submarine operational area to Japanese warships, it will be appraised as 
applied to Japanese merchant ships. The Japanese merchant ships, like the 
British, were armed, reported submarine sightings, and attempted to ram 
or otherwise attack submarines.153 In short, such merchant ships were 
fur.ctionally incorporated into the Japanese naval forces. Consequently, 
there can be no doubt but that these merchant ships were the lawful 
objects of "unrestricted submarine warfare," that is, attack without warn-
Review, 27 Brit. Y.B.I.L. 508 ( 1950). 
For the view that art. 22 of the London Naval Treaty ( 1930) is obsolete see Kerr, 
"International Law and the Future of Submarine Warfare," 81 Nav. Inst. Proc. 
1105 ( 1955) 0 
150 Japanese submarine operational areas are not referred to in the judgment of 
the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. There is a reference to the 
alleged legality of attacking "unarmed enemy merchant ships" between Hawaii and 
the U.S. west coast in the proceedings. F.E.I.M.T. Proc. 27,296 (twenty seven thou-
sand two hundred ninety-six). Japanese submarine warfare is considered in Ch. IV 
of the present study. 
151 Possibly the small numbers of such vessels and the limited area traversed by 
them on voyages in the North Pacific made this tactically feasible. 
152 A secret explanatory message of Dec. 22, 1941 from the U.S. Chief of Naval 
Operations to the U.S. Special Naval Observer, London made no express claim con-
cerning neutrals. It stated: 
UNRESTRICTED AIR AND SUBMARINE WARFARE AGAINST JAPAN 
MEANS THAT SUBMARINES AND AIR MAY ATTACK ANY OBJEC-
TIVE WHATSOEVER THAT IS JAPANESE OR IS CONTROLLED BY 
JAPAN OR IS OPERATING FOR THE DIRECT BENEFIT BENEFIT (sic) 
OF JAPAN. 
Text from photographic copy of original which was declassified March 29, 1961. 
153 Admiral Nimitz so stated in response to questions #9 and # 11. 40 I.M.T. 
109- 10. 
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ing within the operational area enforced by submarines.154 These are the 
principal reasons for the conclusion of the legality of the United States 
submarine operational area in the Pacific. 
The submarine operational area may also be appraised in terms of 
reprisal. The message of December 7, 1941 contains no express indication 
that the unrestricted submarine warfare was to be justified as reprisal 
action. That Admiral Nimitz thought reprisal was the basis appears in his 
answers to other questions of the Nuremberg interrogatories: 
17. Q. Has any order of the U.S. Naval authorities mentioned in 
the above questionnaire concerning the tactics of U.S. sub-
marines toward Japanese merchantmen been based on the 
grounds of reprisal? If yes, what orders? 
A. The unrestricted submarine and air warfare ordered on 7 
December 1941 resulted from the recognition of Japanese 
tactics revealed on that date. No further orders to U.S. sub-
marines concerning tactics toward Japanese mechantmen 
throughout the war were based on reprisal, although specific 
instances of Japanese submarines committing atrocities toward 
U.S. merchant marine survivors became known and would 
have justified such a course. 
19. Q. On the basis of what Japanese tactics was the reprisal consid-
ered justified? 
A. The unrestricted submarine and air warfare ordered by the 
Chief of Naval Operations on 7 December 1941 was justified 
by the Japanese attacks on that date on U.S. bases, and on 
both armed and unarmed ships and nationals, without warn-
ing or declaration of war.155 
It is well known that the German claim to establish submarine opera-
tional areas in the First World War w~s based upon the argument of 
legitimate reprisal as response to allegedly unlawful British naval warfare. 
That claim has been upheld as valid in the present study .156 By the same 
reasoning, it is clear that the present claim to a submarine operational 
area could also be upheld as a legitimate reprisal in response to Japanese 
violations of the traditional law. Aside from Admiral Nimitz' answers 
~See the U.S. Navy Dept. Press Release of Feb. 2, 1946 entitled, "United States 
Submarine Contributions to Victory in the Pacific," pp. 13A-14, quoted in part in 
Tucker 66, n. 47. The press release assumed incorrectly that the sinking of Japanese 
merchant ships in the operational area was a violation of the London Naval Treaty, 
art. 22. 
If particular Japanese merchant ships, for example some deep-sea fishing boats, 
were not participating in the naval war, such boats could not be sunk lawfully without 
warning. 
155 40 I.M.T. 111. 
106 See the text accompanying notes 49-62 supra. 
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quoted above, there is no indication that reprisal has been used to justify 
the United States operational area. 
4. Submarine Operational Areas in Future General War 
The present analysis postulates a nonnuclear general war or, in the 
alternative, a general war with only limited use of nuclear weapons for 
tactical '}lurposes.157 It is assumed that a central objective of the political 
elites of states with the capability of conducting an all-out war of thermo-
nuclear devastation is to avoid such a war.158 In the type of general war 
postulated, a war similar to the World Wars, it is realistic to expect claims 
to establish submarine operational areas because some major states do not 
have the capacity to conduct independent naval operations on the high 
seas except through the extertsive use of submarines.159 
In proje~ting the future course of legal decision concerning submarine 
operational areas in general war it is necessary to accord some significance 
to the past course of decision. The course of decision in both World Wars, 
although freqHently justified as reprisals, is actually a development of the 
customary law. This development has resulted in the adaptation of the law 
to permit the effective use of submarine operational areas as well as to 
permit the effective use of surface naval power. It would be highly 
unrealistic to conclude that the entire practice of naval warfare, both sub-
marine and surface, in the two World Wars is comprised of merely tem-
porary variations from the traditional law conditioned upon the existence 
of illegality in the conduct of war by the opposing belligerent.160 The 
importance of the economic objective in generai war indicates that this 
objective has been and will be energetically pursued in the future through 
submarine as well as surface naval power. The wartime perspective is 
reflected in Prime Minister Asquith's statement to the House of Commons 
on March 1, 1915: 
We are not going to allow our efforts ... to be strangled in a network 
of juridical niceties. . . . Under existing conditions there is no form 
of economic pressure to which we do not consider ourselves en-
titled to resort. 161 
157 Such use of nuclear weapons is considered in Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear 
Option ( 1966). 
158 See generally Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy ( 195 7). 
159 
"Only [Soviet] submarine operations would be significant in the great oceans." 
Garth off 215. 
180 As to the surface enforced long-distance blockade, its indispensability is indicated 
in Prof. Medlicott's "assessment and perspective." 2 Medlicott 630- 61. As to the 
submarine operational area, it has been indispensable to the United States as well as 
to other states. At the beginning of the Pacific war it was used before other offensive 
methods of naval warfare were available to the United States. 
181 Quoted in Seymour, American Diplomacy During the World War 28 ( 1934) 
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It has been stated that the inadequacy of the International Military 
Tribunal's opinion in the case of Admiral Donitz is due in part to its ap-
parent assumption that the claim to an operational area could only be 
upheld through the existence of sufficient surface naval power to exercise 
effective control. Consistent with this opinion, Mr. Colombos has, in 
substance, characterized submarine naval power as "naval weakness." 162 
The actual success of submarines in enforcing operational areas in the 
World Wars does not support the charge of "naval weakness." Submarine 
naval power is, of course, different from surface naval power in many 
respects. Nevertheless, the high degree of effective control manifested in 
submarine operational areas should not be rendered juridically inadequate 
by simply testing it in terms of the method of control exercised by surface 
naval power. Even if it should be concluded that submarines during the 
World Wars did not achieve sufficient control, it is clear that contempo-
rary nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed submarines could achieve a 
much greater degree of control in the operational area. 
The concept of "freedom of the seas" has not outlawed submarine 
operational areas in past general wars. The best-known formulation of 
this concept appears in the second of President Wilson's fourteen points: 
Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial 
waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed 
in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of 
international covenants.163 
It is not surprising that the British made a reservation to this point.164 
In attempting to reassure them and obtain their agreement, at least in 
principle, President Wilson explained: 
Blockade is one of the many things which will require immediate re-
definition in view of the many new circumstances of warfare develop-
ed by this war. There is no danger of its being abolished.165 
The outcome of President Wilson's attempt to obtain international sup-
port for the freedom of the seas166 was that it was not included in the 
Treaty of Versailles. The available evidence seems to indicate that con-
(footnote omitted) . President Seymour regarded Asquith's statement as going far_ 
"towards an admission of illegality." I d. at 40. 
16
a Colombos 4 70. The sentence from which the quoted words are taken appears in 
full in the text accompanying supra note 73. 
163 [1918] Foreign Rel. U.S. Supp. 1 val. 1, 15 ( 1933). 
164 I d. at 421-23. 
165 Id. at 428. 
163 See the account of the attempt in Seymour, op. cit. supra note 161 at 381-89. 
See also 2 Savage, Policy of the United States Toward Maritime Commerce in War 
158-60 (Dept. of State, 1936). 
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ceptions of the freedom of the seas will not outlaw submarine operational 
areas in future general wars.167 
To the extent that general war including naval economic warfare is a 
future possibility/68 claims to establish operational areas controlled and 
enforced by nuclear-powered submarines may be expected. The claims 
may be manifested in the actual conduct of operational area warfare, as 
was done by the United States in the Second World War, rather than in 
words. 169 It does not seem a realistic way of promoting human values, 
particularly in the light of the two World Wars, to contend that this use 
of an efficient military technique is unlawful. It is clear that such con-
tentions have had little impact on the actual process of decision thus far. 
In addition, it is of central importance that the destruction of human 
and material values involved in the use of such operational areas is not 
disproportionate to their military efficiency. Consequently, it appears that 
the continued legality of this method of warfare is assured in general war. 
Another general war based on the pattern of the two World Wars does 
not, however, appear to be the most probable future type of war.170 
C. CLAIMS TO ESTABLISH SUBMARINE OPERATIONAL 
AREAS IN LIMITED WAR SITUATIONS 
Limited wars with major powers as the participants and those with 
minor powers as the participants were referred to in Chapter I. The legal-
ity of submarine operational areas in each limited war category should be 
appraised. 
1. Claims by Major Powers in Limited War 
It is clear that the coercive methods which are employed to achieve 
the objectives of limited war must be limited. Assuming that the bellig-
erents comprise major powers wih great military capabilities, each 
must limit the extensity of the area it uses for coercive purposes. If this 
167 The doctrinal scope and content of "freedom of the seas" is indicated in 4 
Whiteman 501-633; 2 Hackworth 653-710. 
The limitations involved in the Groti~n conception of the freedom of the seas are 
considered in Reppy, "The Grotian Doctrine of the Freedom of the Seas Re-
appraised," 19-¥Fordham L. Rev. 243, 275-78 ( 1950). 
1611 The indications are that the Soviet Union is not projecting a quick nuclear war 
in which economic warfare would count for little. See Garthoff passim. 
169 The United States conduct of submarine operational area warfare constituted 
the claim since the order to conduct such warfare was secret. See the text accom-
panying note 145 supra. 
170 See the projection of the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations quoted in the text of 
Ch. I accompanying note 115. 
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is not done, the result may be an extension of the area of war beyond that 
consistent with the limited objectives of the war.171 
The submarine operational area has been employed historically as a 
method of general war. The absence of claims to establish such areas 
should be taken as one indication that the war is to be limited in this 
respect.172 It will be recalled that in general war situations, neutral in-
terests in maintaining commerce with a belligerent were deemed to be of 
lesser importance than the belligerent interest in employing the submarine 
operational area. In limited war, the opposite result can be maintained 
more plausibly. It would be surprising indeed if the objectives of the bellig-
erents, limited by definition, were accorded precedence over the interests 
of neutrals in maintaining commerce. 
The experience in the Korean War supports this analysis. That war 
manifested neither submarine operational areas nor other modern methods 
of general war such as the long-distance surface blockade.173 The United 
States, in fact, maintained a traditional close-in naval blockade.174 
In summary, submarine operational areas will most probably not be 
employed in limited wars between major powers because of the basic 
inconsistency between submarine operational areas as employed in the 
two World Wars and the objectives of limited war, rather than because 
of an interpretation of the Submarine Protocol of 1936.175 If such areas 
should be employed at all they would be employed in a much more re-
stricted manner than in the World Wars. This conclusion is also supported 
by the primacy of neutral commercial interests over belligerent interests 
in the context of limited war. 
2. Claims by Minor Powers in Limited War 
Some wars are limited in the sense that the belligerents are only 
capable of limited military efforts. In this type of war it may be predicted 
with some confidence that the interests of neutrals will be protected 
through their power and influence as opposed to that of the belligerents. 
The Nyon Agreement provides an illustration of this.176 Anything except 
restricted submarine operational areas will probably be denied to the bellig-
erents of they cause substantial inconvenience, much less danger, to the 
neutral states. It is unlikely that a minor belligerent would be permitted 
171 Osgood 243-48 stresses the importance of "geographical limitation." 
172 Osgood 240 refers to "the general requirement of the formulation and com-
munication of limited objectives .... " 
173 See Cagle & Manson passim. 
174 /d. at 281-84. 
175 The International Military Tribunal's interpretation is considered and criticized 
in the text accompanying notes 112-28 supra. 
176 See the Nyon Agreement ( 193 7) considered in the text of Ch. II accompany-
ing notes 124-32. 
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to disrupt world trade by the employment of submarine operational areas· 
of the kind associated with general war. If minor belligerents should make 
claims to establish such areas, stressing their military efficiency and neces-
sity,~ the claims may well be outweighed by the claims of neutrals against 
their use.177 In addition, a minor belligerent would probably not have 
sufficient submarine naval power to maintain a submarine operational 
area effectively. 
3. Claims to Establish Restricted "Operational Areas" 
A careful legal appraisal should avoid automatically ruling out the 
drastically restricted use of naval power either in limited war or in coer-
cive situations short of limited war.178 Whether it is termed "limited naval 
blockade," "quarantine-interdiction," some kind of "operational area," or 
given another label, one should be slow to condemn as illegal such limited 
measures especially when they are u~d to maintain world public order.179 
This is particularly true where the principal alternatives may be the use 
of much more coercion including weapons of mass destruction. Whether 
or not submarines are employed in such uses of naval power including 
restricted "operational areas" would appear to make but little difference 
in a legal appraisal. 
In describing the use of coercion in the United States quarantine-inter-
diction of Soviet Union missiles to Cuba in 1962, the present writer has 
stated: 
[T]he formulation and implementation of the naval quarantine-
interdiction amounted to the least possible use of the military instru-
ment. Any lesser use would have amounted to abandonment of the 
military instrument and exclusive reliance upon non-coercive pro-
cedures which most certainly would have been ineffective without 
supporting military power.1 80 
177 Seymour, op. cit. supra note 161 at 29 stresses the importance of the neutral role 
even in general war. 
178 See Powers, "Blockade: For Winning Without Killing," 84 Nav. lnst. Proc. 
No.8, p. 61 ( 1958). 
Naval power or enforcement should not, of course, be used without reason. For 
an unpersuasive recommendation of the establishment of submarine defense identifi-
cation zones (by supposed analogy to the U .S. Air Defense Identification Zones ) 
which apparently gives inadequate consideration to possible re taliation, see Sweitzer, 
"Sovereignty and the SLBM," 92 Na v. Inst. Proc. No. 9, p. 32 ( 1966) . 
179 T he U ni ted Nations Charter ar t. 2 ( 4) prohibits " the th reat or use of force 
aga inst the terr itorial integrity or political independence of a ny sta te .... " Art. 51 
recognizes the existence of "the inherent righ t of ind ividual or collective self-defense." 
T ogether they constitute a minimum public order system in the sense of outlawing 
coercion fo r aggressive purposes wh ile legalizing it for defensive purposes. 
180 Mallison, "Limited Naval Blockade or Quarantine-Interdiction: National and 
Collective D efense Claims Valid Under International Law," 31 Ceo. Wash. L. Rev. 
355, 393 (1 962 ) (footnotes omitted). 
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This is an example of the kind of coercion which should not be con-
demned without consideration of the alternatives in the factual situation 
including the effects of other coercive methods as well as the effects of the 
abandonment of all coercion.181 
181 Some apparently would not agree with the textual statement. See e.g. Wright, 
"The Cuban Quarantine," 57 A.].I.L. 546 ( 1963). Prof. Wright's legal analysis 
appears to be based upon the factual conclusion that the missiles involved only a 
commercial transaction in time of peace. ""' 
It is difficult to find that the Soviet Union violated any obligation of inter-
national law in shipping missiles to, and installing them in, Cuba, at the request 
of the Castro government. Under general international law, states are free to 
engage in trade in any articles whatever in time of peace. 
I d. at 548-49 (footnote omitted). 
